
The reprocessing industry is responsible for some of the most hazardous transports undertaken today - intensely radioactive spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste and international concern has concentrated on these shipments. The General Assembly of the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) has decided to hold a special consultative meeting in 1996 to discuss the transport of spent fuel, plutonium, high level wastes and other nuclear materials following continued concern over the effectiveness of the Code of Practice adopted by the IMO in 1993.
The IMO's Code of Practice for the Safe Carriage of Irradiated Nuclear Fuel, Plutonium and High Level Radioactive Wastes did little except endorse present nuclear industry practice - and extended both the quantities and types of radioactive material allowed to be carried on passenger ship, roll-on/roll-off vessels and general freight vessels. The only concession to opposition from many non-nuclear countries was to accept that the Code should be "augmented and improved" as a matter of "high priority".
When the Code of Practice was adopted, in the face of strong opposition from the three main countries involved in such nuclear transports, the UK,
France and Japan, it was seen as only a first step and it was agreed the code should be reviewed and improved. (Pictured left is the Aberthaw Fisher taking plutonium nitrate from Dounreay to Sellafield.) In 1993 it was the Nordic countries, in particular Iceland, and the Pacific nations which voiced the strongest concerns over the safety of shipments of extremely radioactive and toxic nuclear cargoes. There was concern that some shipments were carried out in ordinary roll-on/roll-off ferries, cargo vessels and even passenger ferries, that the shipments were not covered by full insurance liability, and posed health, environmental and economic risks. In addition the Code of Practice did little other than adopt existing industry practice and, indeed, even approved relaxed regulation in a few instances.
The IMO agreed to review the Code, including specific hazards associated with maritime transport of flasks and the consequences of a severe accident; ship structural design requirements for securing flasks to avoid separation from the ship in an accident; route planning, notification of coastal states; the restriction or exclusion of ships from particularly sensitive sea areas; the adequacy of emergency response arrangements; measures to locate and identify ships or flasks lost in an accident; the availability of salvage equipment and expertise to recover sunken flasks; and monitoring vessels during shipments.
BNFL said it had decided to use sea transport rather than rail and ferry because it needed a "secure alternative" because of doubts over the future of channel ferries, especially the Nord Pas de Calais, which has been used for spent fuel shipments in recent years, after environmental and union actions closed most other routes. Environmental groups, in particular Greenpeace, have often disrupted both trains and ferries carrying spent fuel. BNFL's new plans will make similar action much more difficult
flasks withstand an impact speed of 464km/h compared with 48km/h for the IAEA.(Pictured right is a plutonium flask being loaded onto another vessel used for the shipments, the Aberthaw Fisher).
Under current IAEA standards for withstanding fires a flask must withstand a fire of 800C for 30-60 minutes - the US standard is 760C for an hour. Research has shown, however, that fires on ships often burn at up to 2,000C and at least a day. In the UK in 1985 there was an often quoted test conducted to show how tough a flask was when an empty train was crashed into the 368mm thick steel site of a flask used to transport Magnox spent fuel. The industry used this test to illustrate flask safety - but other flasks, often taking spent fuel from Japan to the UK, have 90mm sides together with 160mm lead lining. Also the Department of Transport has accepted the test subjected the flask to only about half the present IAEA standard.
In the past the plutonium has been fabricated into new fast reactor fuel at Sellafield and then flown back to Dounreay. But with the closure last year of the PFR reactor there is no need for fresh fuel so the plutonium is probably shipped out of Dounreay because of lack of storage facilities at the site.
The European Shearwater encountered gale force winds and high seas on her normal route through the Minches and was forced to shelter. The shipment caused considerable protest in Scotland and Ireland, where it was raised in the Irish Parliament. Among the protests in Scotland the Western Isles MP, Mr Calum MacDonald, called on the Government to stop future shipments. "Such shipments are of concern at even the best of times because of the potential for environmental disaster should any accident occur. To send a relatively small vessel, carrying such a sensitive cargo, in such atrocious conditions was grossly irresponsible and must not be allowed to happen again", Mr MacDonald said. The Western Isles Islands Council also voiced serious concern. Council convener Donald Mackay demanded the shipments stop. Dounreay commented that all shipments were carried out within international regulations, were perfectly safe and that there had been no accident in 30 years of such transports.
The Government rejected Mr Macdonald's demands for local authorities along the shipping routes to be given at least five days notice of shipments. Transport minister Viscount Goschen reject Mr Macdonald's call, stating that he saw no reason why coastal local authorities required prior notification of shipments. Shipments of plutonium nitrate from Dounreay to Sellafield via the Minch were monitored by the UKAEA and Pacific Nuclear Transport, the shipping company, as well as coastguards. "That level of monitoring would enable notifications to be given quickly to an appropriate local or other authority in the unlikely event of an emergency developing", Viscount Goshen commented.
